people may see the need to abide by the vision. >> really terrific discussion. please join me in thanking our panelists, victor cha, masafumi ishii, sung kim, sung-han kim for joining us this morning. we will move directly into the next panel, so if we could have the participants come up. audience, if you need to grab a cup of coffee or anything please do so but we will make a transition here. >> moving now [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> thanks for joining the panel on us/rok travel corporation. i am the deputy director and senior fellow.

in the previous session we discussed ways for us/rok/japan to expand their trilateral cooperation in the face of growing security challenges from north korea. the second panel, moving beyond the korean peninsula moving beyond escalating tensions between china and taiwan and ways for the us/rok/japan to work together to maintain peace and stability in the region. i am joined -- it's my pleasure to introduce each of them. on my left is sung-han kim from the asia-pacific center for security studies at the institute of the us department of state defense based in hawaii. his area of expertise covers

korea, korea, china, china, korean peninsula relations, north korea simply a program, us alliance in east asia. next is the director of contemporary chinese studies and professor of the graduate school of asia-pacific studies, she specializing in china contemporary foreign policy and politics. last but not least is my colleague, brian hart with the china project. due to a personal emergency, he can't participate but in her place, brian kindly decided to join us at the last minute so thank you for joining us. brian is helping to lead a special institute that shines a

light on underappreciated chinese influences through open source data and satellite imagery. has reachers focuses on chinese foreign policy, security policy, china's military monetization, china policy and taiwan security issues. thank you for joining us today and before we begin let me say this is the first time for the korean chair to discuss the china relations as a standalone public discussion topic so for the audience, those in the audience who may not have followed this issue closely i would like to ask our panelists to give some initial remarks on how each of their respective countries view this issue between taiwan and china and the conflict between them. let me start with brian may be. >> thanks for having me, thanks to the korea chair and thanks, ellen, for moderating, glad to be here.

this is a gruesome topic that makes a lot of sense you're having this discussion on china and taiwan in the context of us/japan/rfk ties. i wanted to talk broadly about the trajectory of us/taiwan relations and pivot little bit to how beijing is responding so just to start with the basics if you ever hear us officials talk about us/taiwan relations you will hear them use the mantra of the us one china policy is based on the taiwan relations act of 1979, three joint communiqués and 6 assurances, there's really decades of policy that remains consistent on the us approach to taiwan and are one china policy. official us policy on taiwan is we acknowledge beijing's position that taiwan is part of china but we don't make an

actual, we don't recognize that position and don't have an official position on taiwan's sovereignty in us policy is focused on pushing all sides to resolve this issue peacefully and without coercion so us policy is focused on the taiwan relations act provides mechanisms and guidance on providing taiwan with defensive weaponry and that's largely in the context of growing chinese pressure. as we look at the balance of power and chinese efforts to pressure taiwan washington has continued to arm taiwan's defense of capable used to increase deterrence, deter china from taking military action against taiwan. that's the core of where we are. an important point to make is us policy towards taiwan is very bipartisan. you see that in congress,

wanting to maintain a robust unofficial relation with taiwan, people to people exchanges in the economic space too so there's a lot of support in washington for continued relations with taiwan and continued strengthening. within that framework it's important to emphasize recent developments during the biden administration. the biden administration has taken tactical efforts from their perspective to increase deterrence against china from using threats and coercion, you've seen president biden make unscripted remarks multiple times, four times now under his administration he would come to taiwan's defensive china attack taiwan, but his administration has been quick to come back and say there is no official shift in us policy so by and large the us continues to have a strategy

of strategic ambiguity whether we would come to taiwan's defense so officially no change but there have been tactical, oratorical shifts perhaps. you've also seen a couple other efforts from the administration to do things like use presidential authority to provide taiwan with military aid which is a tactical shift in how we actually support taiwan but not changing official us policy. from beijing's perspective beijing has constantly in the last couple years referred to this as us attempting to hollow out the us one china policy. they have increasingly used statements including from xi jinping the taiwan is in the core of china's core interests. making these statements that used washington, provoking, using taiwan as a card to contain china and press china.

that's beijing's perspective. i think there been two major flash points in the last year and 1/2 that have really created a deterioration in relations and us/china relations as well and the first as many of you are familiar the august 2022 visit to taiwan by nancy pelosi. china responded much more strongly than i think many anticipated. they provoked the largest, held the largest military exercises in decades significantly closer to taiwan, flying ballistic missiles over taiwan, very provocative, moves by the chinese liberation army to send a signal of beijing's displeasure with that, diplomatically beijing also canceled or suspended 8 key areas of dialogue including cooperation and other areas and

some of those relations were only revived or restarted in the last couple months after the november 2023 biden and xi summit in san francisco. there was long period where tensions were high between the us and china because of the taiwan issue. the second flash point was in april 2023 taiwan's president transited through the united states with speaker mccarthy. china held large-scale metro the military exercises around taiwan, took less provocative steps. didn't fire missiles over the island in april but again, we did see them take significant military action and poached one of the remaining allies, these are major flash points in the relationship destabilizing issues for stability.

but about midway through last year we started to see the biden administration and beijing start to reengage where we had multiple important cabinet level meetings culminating in november 2023 summit between biden and xi where xi jinping agreed to restart military to military dialogue and other areas of cooperation and us requests for things like fentanyl. we had stabilization reemerge in november and that was crucial because that came just before the january 2024 taiwan elections which have just taken place where we saw, now vice president win as probably expected. so far as beijing hasn't taken major military responses but the thing i would flag, the year is still early so while

things are relatively stable right now there is still concern among the china policy community in washington that after the inauguration, we may see beijing provoke a military response or take action. 2,024 still early so while we are starting off things in a pretty decent place are pretty stable place there's a lot of opportunity for escalation and the presidential elections if the rhetoric keeps up in china becomes a key issue will see taiwan come back to the 4. i hope those are helpful framing remarks. i will wrap up but look forward to questions. >> thank you so much for enlightening me to hear, and ask to talk about japan's

position regarding china and taiwan. japan, the prc, to communicate in 1972, japan's official position has always been the japan recognize government of the people's republic of china as the government of china. so to japan, both japan, both china and taiwan are very important, japan and china have reaffirmed their strategic relationship last year during the apack, china is japan's largest trading partner in one of the largest investment destinations for japanese companies so economic relations

between china and japan are very close. in the meantime japan also opened up in my ties with taiwan and people to people exchanges with taiwan. there's an enduring affinity so basically speaking japan's position has not changed since the normalization of relations between japan and china since 1972. but of course it is also true that japan is deepening cooperation and exchanges with taiwan. ..wan is an important partner with which we share fundamental values. so this change might have been driven by several factors but geographical proximity to taiwan and china's assertive behavior

in the e in the east china sea, the main reason for the growth of japan's relations withon taiwan. well that is simply because the maintain peace and stability across the taiwan strait is that the four of japan's security policy. and precedence, starting 2013 the year, the first year of his presidency of its gold solution to the standoff over sovereignty won't be able to wait forever. so the statement has actually raised, has been a source of alarm in japan about the possibility of a war across the taiwan strait. but, so in terms in order to

prevent a conflict across the taiwan strait, i think japan's policy is threefold. one, the first is to invest in japan's defense capabilities. and meanwhile, japan is fully aware, well, japan cannot win a warr alone. so that is why japan, that is why a strong u.s.-japan alliance is indispensable for japan. and third, japan is also working hard to deepen defense cooperation with countries such as australia and iraq, including intelligence sharing, , economic security, cooperation and energy security. also in terms of topic opinion, so i will say the russian invasion of ukraine was a

wake-up call to many pacifists japanese, and they have realized that war can't happen overnight. so generally speaking, i would say topic support for strong u.s.-japan alliance for a strong, like rock, u.s.-japan and military buildup so this kind of support is now on the rise. i will stop here. thank you. >> is. >> so thank you for the opportunity. syllabus a few words of disclaimer first. i should say that use a present only are my personal opinion, not those of department of defense. so i have an argument for the session which is that a think a major crisis in east asia will

start from korean peninsula, not taiwan strait. as far as geo contingencies concerns, many people have debated for the last three years so what will north korea do if there is a contingency in taiwan strait? i think the question should be reversed this year, that what we china do if there is a contingency on the korean peninsula? so to discuss this question i would compare the change of perspective on the korean peninsula and taiwan strait and the various conditions that will enable or hinder the surprise attack in each region. within night or ten minutes or so. so for north korea why has kim jong-un denounce unification of beginning of 20124? scholars have suggested it should be about election cycle since south korea or u.s. may be important by russia or china and kim jong-un might want to intimidate south korean war. before all these comp these other regions they kim jong-un

did not need to announce among we reification. north korea has shown their creativity in coming up with nasty wars and aggressive rhetoric to justify its aggression. he's an objective, kim jong-un did not have to abandonfi unification policy making fundamental shift in national narrative and denying the history of mission inherited from his grandfather. so i believe it has more to do with the domesticc politics with kim jong-un's concern about south korea's cultural and ideal influence that have been growing in north korea, special among the young generation, given that north korea has passed a series of laws, the laws to prevent ideological -- the law to guarantee, make sure young north koreans public culture, last and

with also passed a law to protect the cultural language of pyongyang to the south korea land. so i mention that this is more about domestic politics to eradicate south korean identity, and then that internal concern reach to the level that kim jong-un has announced abandonment of unification policy. and if we agree about domestic policies, we can expect something like -- can happen again. because in 2007 at happened, , s more about domestic politics or power transition from kim jong-il to kim jong-un. so unification policy -- domestic policy that may be assigned north korea may directly targetth south korean life and korean cane game d in 2010. the situation across thn

straight, xi jinping preoccupied with domestic issues and should be worried about ple given report of corruption of leadership so not the best time for china to take dilatory action against taiwan unless taiwan make radical moves toward independence and taipei is not likely to do so because taiwan has the same problem, domestic problems, high housing prices will be his priority [indiscernible] legislation is divided so it is not also ideal time for new administration to make radical move toward independence so

taiwan straight seems relatively will maintain status quo. let me disclose why korean peninsula -- taiwan enjoys the stopping power of the water for pla to invade taiwan, it has to cross and amphibious attack requires time or mobilization and pla preparation for amphibious invasion will cannot proceed without u.s. intelligence community and north and south korea share a land border and a record of naval conflicts in the west see so military conflict is easier to break out in the land on korea

peninsula rather than taiwan straight and korean peninsula is more likely to have conflict because of frequency of military exercise. both china and north korea tend to increase military provocation whenever south korea or taiwan conduct military exercise. taiwan implements one joint exercise at the national level per year. north korea has five times more opportunities to justify their aggression using south korea military exercise and conflict on the korean peninsula can escalate faster than taiwan straight because of offensive military doctrine so since 2012

south korea has developed the three axis system so three parts, first a preemptive strike against north korea [indiscernible] and second is air missile defense system and third is korea massive punishment and retaliation plan such as infiltration of special ops. all of these strategies are recorded openly at the south korea flight paper. taiwan defense paper explains attacking the enemy at the most vulnerable place so they understand the geography of the taiwan straight and taiwan

strategy does not include preemptive or retaliatory strike against pla military bases on may land or operation in beijing but they does [indiscernible] to summarize all these element korean peninsula geography and south korea offensive doctrine suggest kim jong-un does not intend to start a major crisis but anything can escalate into a bigger crisis and then he might intend in the first place so more likely to happen on korean peninsula then escalate much faster than taiwan straight. i do not mean to underestimate china threat to taiwan however china's military challenges in the taiwan straight are

uncertain but within critical range and chain reactions are unpredictable so to conclude so what does all of this analyst apply, deterrence need to be strengthened as much as they are in the taiwan straight but the most important a difficult challenge is to make sure we fully understand south korea's counterattack and china has a role to play as chinese officials say china can influence and reverse activity but at least beijing can communicate south korea's response if they provoke and for the sake of their own interest china -- north korea better not

make too much trouble so here we should consider combining military exercise and diplomacy to engage with beijing in one voice if it is true beijing intends to avoid a major crisis and maintain status quo in the taiwan straight they should be more to do so on the korean peninsula. >> thank you. this is a very interesting. i have a couple of things to pick up and then would like to follow up with each of you but maybe you could explain a little bit about south korea's stance on the china taiwan issues. we heard from -- we heard about the u.s. and japan official

policy on taiwan issue but i would like to hear your thoughts on south korea. obviously south korea has been very cautious about this issue but we recently we have been seeing small changes. does it mean there is a policy shift on where south korea stands on the issue? what is driving the change? and then i would like to hear about the joint statement leaders of south korea, japan, and united states about the same 90 day adopted in the joint camp david summit, the language, they say reaffirm for peace and stability across the taiwan straight as an indication of prosperity and the international community. is that language sign of sort of three countries relying on this

issue? if not, where [indiscernible] >> south korea government position on taiwan straight issue has been moving from [indiscernible] -- it is moving closer to the u.s. position but there is still time so in 2021 during the summit between the president's for the first time they include the phrase south korea also emphasize that peace and stability of taiwan straight in the joint statement it was the first time. during the domestic briefing it was mentioned south korea policy has not changed at all, just emphasized the peace and stability everyone cares about achieving of course including

china as well so he emphasized one china policy has not changed and another senior official said china should be happy because south korean president did not pull out china in the statement. so in the summit in may 2022 include -- includes the phrase south korea cares about peace and stability about the peninsula. but last april before the summit the president framed taiwan issue as international with implication beyond northeast asia and that prompted beijing

serious reaction and there was backpedaling and accumulation of other south korean high officials, defense mr. and foreign minister remarked the same message we care about taiwan straight peace and stability so there was progression about [indiscernible] an element of ambiguity that south korea government never said what they want to do if there is a contingency in taiwan straight, south korea's vice defense minister said south korea does not have any conversation about contingency in taiwan straight with u.s. so there is political to talk about peace and stability from south korean perspective but no comment about contingency plan yet. >> i think i was gonna iterate

the same point about the statement that the taiwan issue is not just domestic, it is of international importance and that angered beijing because the refrain you hear from china's ministry of foreign affairs is constantly that this is a domestic issue for china and to deter others from intervening. that was a significant statement. i think overall the inclusion of taiwan in these statements is it is important. i think it reflects a broad alignment on the china threat perception and concerns among r.o.k., japan, u.s., broad concern about the growing

assertiveness of beijing and the military buildup and provocation toward taiwan and it is a growing recognition on the three countries of the linkage of security issues. you see more admissions at recognition of the fact that these issues are linked, that south korea and japan security is linked to taiwan. you see official statements coming out from korea officials that you know transit through the taiwan straight is critical for korean import so they see this as a big issue for them and so you see more willingness to be for leading but beyond the broad strategic shared threat perception i think there are differences in how the three countries, how much they are willing to be forward leaning. one recent example is japan both u.s. and japan put out official

statements congratulating william lai on winning the election then making a comment on that election which is something beijing fire back at immediately criticizing them and i think we have not seen that from the r.o.k. side so there is more desire to remain quiet around some of these issues and the last thing i will say is in terms of beijing's response has been to take r.o.k. and japan action on taiwan as being pawns for the united states, they task this as the united states using them as ships to put pressure on beijing to suppress beijing so that is the kind of line they have tried to tout here and i think we will likely see more of that thinking so at least publicly there is not this kind

of you know recognition and beijing that you know the r.o.k. and japan are largely responding to their perceived threat perceptions from beijing you know except again they are trying to cap this as just following what the u.s. wants them to do. >> i think japan is geographically close to the taiwan straight, korean and insula, and russia -- korean peninsula, and russia as well. so that means japan is faced with a very serious security environment. for japan, the peninsula, a crisis in the korean peninsula or the taiwan straight are equally important. that is why for japan it is

important, the joint statement that exercise the importance of the taiwan straight crisis is equally important for japan. of course china has harshly criticized japan and south korea after that joint statement. i think china has changed a little bit the approach to south korea and also to japan because china has softened to some degree they are stance toward japan and also to what south korea in order to drive a wedge between the united states and japan or between the u.s. and south korea or even south korea and japan.

so china's reaction has shown that china is criticizing japan and south korea and u.s. moves internationalization of the taiwan issue but so this has led china to change their policy toward japan and south korea. also i do think there are differences in dealing with taiwan straight among the three countries but even so, i think institutionalization of secured cooperation is vital to deal with either taiwan straight crisis or korean peninsula

crisis so the point has been mentioned in the first session that we need to promote the institutionalization of cooperation among the three countries and this kind of cooperation should expand beyond the security area. >> thank you. let's move on to a slightly different topic. taiwan had an election in january. i would like to hear thoughts on their countries reaction to the outcome and brian could you tell us about what the policy toward china and the u.s. will be and do you expect the policy to change and how -- and what do

you think china will likely response to that? >> in terms of taiwan's election in january, i would say japan's, japan is watching very closely china's move because in the run-up to the inauguration of the president -- president-elect in may, the 100 days before may is crucial that we need to watch china's move very carefully. for now, i think china is increasing pressure on taiwan. for example, china's aviation in administration said very brief statement that it has changed a flight plan close to that

sensitive median line in the taiwan straight and this can have a very possible military implications as well and also china has announced that beginning of tariff reduction on some of the products before taiwan's presidential election and that was two days after the presidential election is kind of -- shifted diplomatic ties to china. i would say china is ripping up the pressure on taiwan. in my view, the possibility of war across the taiwan straight is not that high at the moment.

i do not know if you are familiar with the movie all is quiet on the western front. this is a war across the taiwan straight and probably they would be no war across the taiwan straight in the immediate future but actually the tension across the taiwan straight is very high and china is trying to isolate taiwan and the international community and china is trying to put economic pressure on taiwan and has the intention to change the median line across the straight so these kinds of strategies are really difficult to deal because deterrence policy, which we talk a lot

about, deterrence strategy doesn't work very effectively to deal with the kind of strategy china is adopting. so maybe we need to pay more attention to the policies that china is putting a lot of effort into. >> the last year and the year before there was a growth of volume of population of south korean think tank and media about what should south korea do if there is contingency in taiwan so without much discussion there was a lot of discussion about their was likely to be tension in taiwan

straight and by extension of that discussion on the eve of presidential election in taiwan right after that with the victory of ppp the immediate response from south korean press editorial or op-ed was tpp simply means china will continue to threat and conduct military provocation around taiwan island so it is the same argument, south korea should be worried about that but as time goes by there is some more signs of status quo where biden said to the journalist questioned the u.s. will not support taiwan independence so that translates into u.s. preference to maintain status quo followed by analysis this is election year for u.s.

so u.s. does not want to have another contingency taiwan straight and same thing with china as i explained china is faced with so many economic problems and pla leadership problem so not the best time for china to also initiate any major crisis so there is more and more understanding that may be status quo may be maintained at least for this year with the caveat that as long as tpp as they are we should be worried about the worst case which is now being overshadowed by growing threat perception and controversy about north korea change in posture. >> yeah, on the taiwan election specifically, beijing made its views very clear before the election, they did not want to see the tpp likely going and i

think they also knew the polling in taiwan was consistently clear throughout the lead up to election day with showing lai with a small but significant lead so they had months to prepare for this eventuality that he would win so when he did we saw beijing put out statements that ultimately whoever wins an election in taiwan it doesn't change the fact of how they view k-1 -- taiwan. but i think there is a lot of key issues here and slides -- specific dynamics at play that have led to where we are now so it is significant i think from beijing's perception that he did not win the outright majority unlike president lie with a 56%

majority so from their perspective that means lai is coming into this in a different position politically more challenging position for the dpp and the dbp also lost its majority in the legislation so i think additional pressure on the administration once in power and i think a key part of this is lai made statements running up to the election that he would not provoked any major shifts in largely cast his bed for president -- his bid for president as a continuation of the previous administration which has been you know obviously beijing did not want to see the administration i do not want to see a dpp administration but he has been

proactive about limiting the more pro-independent you know of the tehran electorate and i think -- taiwan electorate and while i think he is more forward leaning on independent issues he still cast himself as being large really in continuance of the administrations of that is what i expect in the same is true on relations with the u.s. but it is clear he and his you know future vice president will continue investing in the u.s. relationship and continue trying to strengthen ties with washington but i do think a key issue here is waiting to see what beijing does after the inauguration in may. you know in speaking with chinese card -- counterparts, you know chinese scholars, there seem to be widespread belief and skepticism about him being a continuation of the previous administration and i think andy

and china expect you know have lower expectations for him in terms of they are more worried about him and so they are worried that he could push the envelope in new ways and so i think we are likely gonna see beijing respond to the inauguration but it will be i think contingent, you know, chinese scholars have said they are waiting to see what he says but i do not think they will be giving him much benefit of the doubt i think beijing will want to make his you know bake a assertive response and show they will not you know not be patient with him and so i think that sets us up as i said earlier in my opening remarks i think it sets us up for a pretty tense 2024 especially as the u.s. presidential election heats up as well so i think yeah, not too optimistic about the stability in the straight relation going forward but hopefully i am wrong. >> my next question is we also

have an election here and ambassador masa during that presentation that there is concern about the u.s. possible weakening stance on taiwan issue so i would like to ask about what that would mean for south korea and japan if u.s. shows weakening stance on taiwan. >> i'll take first, yeah. the u.s. weakens commitment for the stability of taiwan may have a lot of impact on south korean perception to the u.s. for their contribution for the stability of east asia overall but can generate a lot of debate and

controversy about south korea's desire for nuclear armament. so we all know 70% of south korean people expressed the desire to have their own nuclear weapon in survey but not why they wanted and the assumption is because of the increased threat from north korea with advanced nuclear weapon capabilities or the u.s. perception lies dysfunctional politics or weakening commitment for defense for allies with the image of trump administration but actually it has more to do with the war in ukraine, politicians saying after seeing what happened in ukraine we

believe in the u.s. alliance but this is a world of uncertainty and we would like to have our own measure of self-help and in a public in in a public survey one publc survey done by korea institute of national you reification asked this question, white you want to nuclear weapon? 30% safe capability but also about uncertain about politics of the north korea or china, even excluding china. so given this trend to u.s. policy in taiwan we will be perceived as another factor of uncertainty of south korean perception about the war politics and they will again generate another discussion or desire for nuclear armament on the south korean peninsula. >> in terms of the upcoming u.s. election, i think we do have a lot of confidence.

so ambassador xi has raised the question about the u.s., the weekend, the possibility of a weekend u.s. commitment in the taiwan strait and this may lead to a possible war or give signal, give, like wrong signal to china. and also there are concerns about the possible trump economic policy, because trump has already declared that if he becomes president he will compose a tariff on chinese goods, i think of more than 60%. so, so either way it could

create an uncertain economic environment, and is likely to be a major shock to markets. so there are many concerns. but having c said that, actually closures. i don't think i'm not, i'm that, i'm cautious, i don't know, i don't know. i'm not that pessimistic about the future because, first of all i think if you look at japan's relations under trump one point, japan is done very well in dealing with trump's demands about, like, sharing issues and also about trade conflicts.

so i think no matter who is going to be the next president of the united states, we need to, how to say, to have a very t smart strategy to deal with that. so, and if we look at the past experience, it's not that bad. well, if we can have a very good strategy. and second, but in terms of korean peninsula issues, i do think, well, well, the next, or if trump becomes the next president, it will increase a lot of uncertainties but if we look at his first term, he tried to negotiate, just have direct talk with north korea.

and, well, it doesn't bear any fruit. anyway, because of the direct talk between the united states and north korea, and china, has shifted its policy to strengthen its relations with north korea because they have those kind of concerns to be excluded from the negotiations in terms of north korea's nuclear program. so i would say that we cannot predict the future, but actually, so what we need to do or what we can do is to think about the possible, the possibilities and try to figure out a better way to deal with

that. >> so we have 13 13 minutes,t me ask final question and open the floor for questions from the audience. so obviously tensions escalating in the korean peninsula and also may be in the future maybe things will change and in tn strait. which raises specter that there could be -- [inaudible] so i'm curious to see, may be about have you seen any signaling by north korea or for china in the taiwan contingency in the latest, if you remember? >> brian, for the same question, i mean, my view is that china north korean relations are, it's a difficult to need. this economic and economic relation for politically i don't

know what's goingng on. but russia, with north korea and closer.s so i was curious whether have you seen any signaling by china of state meteor scholars of china's votet for north korea n the cream can intentionally -- contingency? >> so i think it was 2022, october, when a north korea's high officials in foreign ministry directly commented that north korea pose any u.s. involvement, any economic power involvement in the domestic affairs of our country's. ct expr china and when u.s. officials visited taiwan king john wrote a letter of solidarity to beijing so north korea has cap signaling we are ready to support china if

something happens. i did not see much of such a remark recently and then so north korea clearly expressed support for china's position on taiwan straight whereas i did not hear for decades i did not see much expression from beijing for north korea position on reunification whereas xi jinping made a speech in south korea and expressed he wished for unification of korean peninsula, he did not say i am ready to support south korea but he at least mentioned he wished peaceful unification for korea when he addressed to south korea congressman when he visited

south korea national congress. kim jong-un should be worried about the perspective of unification of peninsula put back t but back your question. so kim jong-un should be busy with coming up with actions or policies that match his unification declaration. he already dismantle all the government agency to reconcile and engage in south korea for unification, international tourism, all. so we may be busy with following up with his own remark more than worry about what happens in taiwan contingencies. >> in terms of i think beijing's perspective on this, i think north korea is really a double-edge sword for china in many respects.

on one hand you see very clear that china's military strategists have thought about they can strategic advantage that comes from having, you know, issue linkages and linking of the crises. so we know that they see advantages potentially if there is a crisis in the taiwan strait or conflict in the taiwan strait, , if you see some potential advantages to north korean or korean peninsula crisis as well as a major distraction for the united states and as i i was putting pressure on u.s. alliances. but i think on the other side they also are really concerned about the unpredictable nature of what that can bring an kindat of the risks for escalation and the inability to control the situation.o i think that particularly true with north korea where beijing is often wary of kim jong-un and some of his provocations.

i think china is watching really warily right now as we see more north korea russia alignment. i think i can double edge i think beijing sees something upsides to the entrance of distracting the united states, putting pressure on the u.s. alliances in the region and potentially helping russia in the war inia ukraine. but again it also, we have seen i think beijing try to kind of managing the situation and avoid the situation where russia and north korea are making decisions that are going to distract china itself. so i think we have seen vice foreign minister go to north korea in recent weeks and issue statements. i do think 202424 will be an important year for china dprk relations, specifically because this will be the 75th anniversary of the founding of the relations. and we have seen during these

recent meetings between chinese and north korean officials we've seen them make these statements that to look forward to strengthening cooperation this year and this is a year of bilateral friendship for them. so i t think there's some opportunities of their probation to strengthen the ties and potential leverage to the benefit, but again i think beijing is worried this can cutd both ways, can kind of spiral out of control if it is not well managed. >> so i would like to take some questions from the floor. >> yes, dave maxson, thank you for your great remarks. dr. joe, if there is a crisis, kim jong-un, can help us understand what his intent, what does he will try, is he trying to achieve? and it south korea responds decisively also with violence,

how will can respond to that? and for all three of you, topic we we touched on his human rights. is there a trilateral potential for trilateral cooperation for human rights p concerning china from forcedna repatriation to north korea to the uyghurs from west, tibetans to the south? isis her trilateral approach possible to chinese human rights? thank you. >> so if you look back what happened in 2010, there was no particular aggression from south korea's military exascale was normal exercise and think about the islands, they were firing to the south, was a regular military exercise. so the variable here, why north korea suddenly take this very personal attack on south korean life and territory, the experts generally agree should be

something of domestic politics to support a power transition process to strengthen kim jong-un as the next leader. still it is only a guess. is true, this guess is popular because it makes sense that fromom kim jong-un we respt him as a rational actor, then they gain from the story risky provocation could before domestic politics from south korea, that wasko so dangerous d could quickly as clear out of control but kim jong-un still, kim found regime still sick again fromm this risk provocatin is domestic variable that we can really understand from the outside. a lot of factor from kim family regime perspective is a what to test, how far south korea can go and also how far the u.s. or china will intervene to stop the escalation of tension. so after the frustration from

the response, -- [inaudible] according tole memo from secrety robert gates. so since they developed this offensive doctrine, it is the modal south korean defense ministry -- meaning south korea were respond immediately powerfully and to the end. it was understood by the u.s. side because that phrase was included in the joint statement between the minister and then secretary austin. but the problem is if north korea conducted another level, another type of provocation, it's okay if they fire missile to the heir to the water, but if a target south korean territory of life, south korea were respond immediately, , possibly into the end. theto question is then, at what will stop?

by the help of these intervention about help of chinese intervention, but again it's offensive doctrine gain understanding from the u.s. side so that's the territory we don't yet know at this point we would want to make sure that kim jong-un understand what south korea is trying to do here. don't try to test our south korea's resolve, and for that matter we need china's engagement in this matter. >> thanks for your talk. i just want to point out, norman solomon has an article full speed ahead on the global titanic about nuclear war. both panels said that trump is

going to be president. it doesn't have to be that way. if biden gives the lbj's speech and bows out, but the democratic convention pick another candidate, the first speaker said there was strategic ambiguity. i don't think it is ambiguity. i think you telling us don't believe ourty eyes that he has some problems with dementia, and trump has a problem with being demented. so it's a simple solution. it doesn't have to turn out thet way you guys think it is. >> thank you. last question, and then we will try to wrap it up weekly. >> hello. i'm see all of -- former deputy

chief of intelligence for bia insole and deputy director in korea. while i was serving in korea and japan, we had a lot of crises that were happening that were behind the scenes people never heard about. so, what i would like to know is we didn't talk about all these different things that could go wrong. are there any things we can do to try to help things go right in terms of confidence building measures that we can try to implement but without going into ways that would make, tie the hands of north korea or china? thank you.u. >> i guess i'll reiterate one thing that is already come up because i do think trilateral measures to strengthen communication arche. i think especially there's been

a lack of coronation, even at the track two dialogue where unofficial dialogue there's been a lack of communication on contingency planning for dual crises in the taiwan strait or the north korean peninsula. i think we are still, i think this to about the work that can be done on thinking through how to manage these tensions and how to make sure they are not linked up to put pressure on beijing and pyongyang but not align their activities. and i think as was our dimension some of these things like joint trilateral military exercise are important for enhancing interoperability and injury we can operate together in some of these contested spaces. i think broadly there's a lot of continue to make and i think the convergence of these three countries under the last two years passed space more growth but itwt do think there'a

lot of work to get into the nitty-gritty of how we operationalize and improve communication. >> times up.ti so we have to conclude right now. so thank you allll the panels fr joining us andso thank you all r listening. thanks. [applause] [applause][e conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] the c-span book show podcast feed makes it easy for you to listen to all c-span's podcast the future nonfiction books in one place seek and discover new authors and ideas. each we were making it convenient for you to listen to

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