i will. thanks everybody for coming. my name is matt baum. it i'm the owner here at people's book along with my wife meghan. really happy to have alex

natasha here tonight. i talk about the book, the internationalists. alex is a national security reporter at politico and the first anchor of national security daily. previously, alex was the white house and national security reporter at vox. he's an associate director at the atlantic council's scowcroft center on international security, where he worked on military issues and u.s. foreign policy. he's won multiple prestigious awards for his reporting in form part of the team that was recognized as, a finalist for the pulitzer prize. he lives here in washington, d.c., just over the border, washington, d.c. and we're also delighted to have in conversation with alex tonight, natasha bertrand, who's a national security correspondent for ccn, then based in washington, d.c. as well. so let's give it up for alex. natasha, thanks so much for being here. thank you, guys. should i use this migration? okay. thank you guys for coming. i'm super excited to be talking to alex about his great new book, the internationalists. it really does chart the rise.

biden's foreign policy team as such that he has around them currently around him, currently. and it does a great job of going through his first couple of years in the many crises in the foreign policy world that that they have faced. so i kind of want to start there and you dedicate really the beginning of your book to talking a lot about it how this team kind of came together before biden was even really considered the front runner as the democratic nominee and how they all kind of knew each other and they were kind of disillusioned or shouldn't even say kind of they're extremely disillusioned by the 2016 election. and the fact that trump won. and they thought there was a real for a kind of new for foreign policy, one that connected with the american middle class, something that jake sullivan, the national security adviser, talks a lot about. so kind of start there. just like what was their vision coming into the administration given this and how did everything kind of get turned upside down with what they wanted to do? well, first, thank you to

people's book for hosting. thank to you for doing this and for your coming out on national hangover day. i really appreciate it. i wore green on purpose. it gets a day late. so to your question, look, the team was you don't get biden's foreign policy without the loss of trump. it is born out of the trauma of that in jake sullivan, as you mentioned, was right next to hillary clinton when she and as she's conceding to him and this guy. right. he's. he's a rhodes scholar, went to yale law school. but he grew up with five siblings in minnesota. and he felt like he got out populist, did by a new york real estate magnate, billionaire. so what he and the democratic establishment miss and he worked at this he founded and helped worked at this organization called national security action and their whole reason for being was set up. whoever the next democratic nominee would be with a set of foreign policy ideas and infrastructure because felt that that had been lacking with the

express goal, of course, of defeating trump in 2020. and what they basically come out to, generally speaking, and this is also jake's own work as he goes around the country talking to people, is this idea that you alluded to of a foreign policy for the middle class, quite literally, meaning any action the u.s. takes in the world has be able to be explained, get some buy in from the american people that without that, no policy would work. now, that's basically a liberal reinterpretation of trump stuff, right, of america first. and in fact, there has to be a populist notion of a foreign policy, which is why. and the white house is not happy with me when i say stuff like this. but there's a lot more trumpism in biden in a biden foreign policy than i think they they even expected to have. so when you have, jake, as national security adviser, when you have a lot of the people that were in national security action scattered throughout the administration, some pretty spots at the state department, white house, u.n. and elsewhere, this idea of foreign for the middle class, this idea of

adopting elements of trump ism and making it part of a biden foreign policy, all of that permeates pretty much decision making that comes about. of course, you know, you can be mugged by reality, as we've seen in recent days, but that is sort of how they go into every problem set. so you mentioned, you know, all of these advisers, including jake sullivan, tony blinken, a lot of the people in that circle, they came up in kind of the same space. they worked for the obama administration. they worked together afterwards, the think tanks. there has been a lot of among some that you know that makes them a little bit insular and that perhaps, you know, their worldview is a little bit elitist or not connected with the realities of what is going. for example, when they tried to do a reset with the russians, for example. so like that, i mean, that there is a certain kind of naivete attached to kind of foreign policy that they have practiced. and so i just wonder what you learned about how they were able to overcome that, if at all, and whether and how relationships

with each other kind of have informed they've approached foreign policy. there's no question that groupthink plagues, the administration now, not always in bad ways. it's just they as you mentioned, they've known each other in past administrations. they live in general area together. they work together. they know each other. they know how each other think in case it doesn't lead to too much diversity of thought. they kind of all know where they're coming from, whether it's whether it leads to problems. depends, right. i mean, on the russia angle, they had the idea of, let's put russia in a box. right? even the great power competition matters. and, you know, there's tons of stuff to worry about. let's put the russia issue in a box. let's let let's meet putin in geneva. let's talk to him. let's tell them, hey, that solarwinds hack, no more of that. no more election interference, no more pretty much everything else. and we are successful there. then we can start to focus on the bigger issues like climate change and china etc., etc. no one in the team really kind of disputed that notion and geneva, they basically all left literally and figured oddly high fiving.

they were like, we did it. we got him. he understands everything. redlines won't be crossed. and of course, a couple of months and a few months later, we have ukraine. but you can also ask this about the afghanistan decision. i don't know. we'll get to that in a second. but there are a of moments that i found in reporting this book that i felt there been a few more questions. there could have been a little bit more red teaming of. that's not to say they're not doing it. i mean, jake is by virtue of being a collegiate debater, cares very deeply in kind of socratic method and and constantly probing and asking questions. and this always leads to interesting reports of just like, oh, jake sullivan believes or john finer, his deputy believes that. but part of that stems from they ask a lot of weird questions that are sort of anathema to their own thinking, but just to sort of get policy apparatus moving, but still sort of at the when the decision time comes, they're not really thinking outside the box. they're usually within their own biases and part again, that's just part of it that they don't really have anyone from outside that obama, biden, nexis, even though that they would argue

that they are far more progressive and far more different from the obama years and they've learned a lot in this time. and there are definitely examples of that, and we'll get to that, especially within the ukraine. but i wanted to ask you, so a big theme of your book also is just how powerful jake sullivan is within the national security apparatus that biden has created. and i remember i spoke to him just before they came into office, and he told me, you know, i don't want my nsc to be micromanage. i don't want it to be too big. and that has all just completely been tossed out the window. i mean, this is one of the most powerful national security councils that in recent memory, they're extremely influential. people like me who cover the pentagon are always that everything has to go through the everything needs approval from jake before goes out and so can you talk a bit about how he gained that very powerful, influential position and that trust of biden. yeah. well, one of the stems from biden like part of it is that biden is the way his management style is, particularly in foreign policy. but most things it is a very

much a four corners guy like i want you to operate within this general context. like here are my three main things and then it's up to jake and the team to go do it. now, that's kind of how works, right? the president's too busy to get into the and by the time something arrives at his level, it's mostly decision making time, but still the interesting thing is jake has purposed it well part of it is the competence jake allows him to maneuver. he has a lot of room to play within those four corners. there's some person mentioned to me, it's a sandbox where he can play a lot within that square. and so the other thing is he's extremely on. he wants to know the minutia of everything. he wants to be in all the meetings. he wants to know every to things. now, again, that's his job. but also has a large team that can him with that kind of information and that he should mostly not mostly stay strong, but he should have a he should spend a lot more time, a wave tops. but he wants to know like real deep on the brief, like a director level. then to your point about centralization, i mean, i had

one person i don't think i think it made the cutting room floor. unfortunately. but one person basically told me that this. nsc is even more centralized in trump's nsc. and we've basically seen that from, you know, from each one going forward. so there's a complete centralization in this white house, jake. and for my money, i know it's not a popular opinion, but i think he's probably the most powerful, best or anything but most powerful national security advisor since kissinger extra. and, you know, maybe influential scowcroft but but just in terms of the power and the relationships he has, of course, with the president, how much the president trusts him, either you know, presented with the right options. i mean, this is all foreign policy is basically through the just operationally, jake, strategically on the president decision early. that's the word. yeah. no, absolutely. jake is extremely influential. so shifting to what i would consider the the administration's major crisis in office, which was the afghanistan withdrawal, you know, you write that biden's was

pretty much made up to withdraw from afghanistan back in 2009 when he returned from there on a trip as v.p. but even though his mind was pretty much made up, he still wanted to go through this very fulsome interagency process to determine whether it was the right move to actually withdraw. so i'm just wondering, like, what you're reporting is about how even despite this very fulsome interagency process about withdrawing, about what it would mean, how did they get it? so wrong in terms of their assessment that they had so much more time figure this out, because you write that they were thinking that it was going to be 18 to 24 months before the was ultimately able to take over the entire country and particularly kabul. so so what did your reporting tell you about how this how this mess happened? yeah, well, first it was very clear from the beginning they did through a rigorous process. but they every biden knew everyone knew what biden wanted

to. yes, he gave them. and, you know, you cover the pentagon, you did it very well of, you know, he gave the military space to give their opinions and their views, know whether to keep 2500 3500 troops. but at the end of the day, everyone sort of knew where biden was. and so even though there was a thorough, you know, inclusive whole of government review process, everyone knew what was to come at the time of decision the showed, as you alluded, that it would take 18 to 24 months for the taliban to take over kabul and ergo the country. now, i'm a bad reporter because. i spent 8000 hours maybe trying to figure out why no one pushed back on that. it goes back to our question about insularity and groupthink. it was amazing to me that with everything we knew about the state of afghan forces was everything we knew about how poorly they had trained with how afghanistan was barely nation. right we'd created a helped create a military and a government but not a nation. how is it possible that and what we knew what the strength of the taliban and how they were there were there were news stories. there was open source material

showing the taliban was perched all these cities. how did no one in these sort of late march april timeframe and this 2021 say hey, that seems a little rosy a little panglossian and as i ask this question to everybody and no one had a good answer, no one was able to say, oh, well, you know, no, you know that or that. but they pushed back on the intelligence or that they believed or anything. there was like really? it was just taken at face value. my, my best answer is, goes back to what we were talking, which is like everyone what biden wanted. so regardless of what the intel, there's really no reason to question it because they were going to leave. now, of course, that timeline shrunk as the taliban swept across the country. but at the time decision that was the belief of the administration and i don't want to say they dilly dally when they were trying work on many other things leading up to the withdrawal that they would need to do. whether that's a drawdown, the embassy, or whether they would keep one. what are you going to do about afghan allies in afghanistan?

how are you going to get them, etc., etc., etc.? again, it's not that they slow walked. it just felt they had more time. and as afghanistan collapsed on the around them, they had to improvise a bunch of stuff, ignore a bunch of things, which is why we still have thousands of afghan allies. so afghanistan is still you know, they closed embassy without any real preparation, just all of that basically had to be done on the fly. and i document in the book a lot of conversations that the administration held with progressive groups and veterans groups and activists. and in those conversations, it becomes exceedingly clear that these activists are, of course, asking for the moon they're asking for, but they also asking for some pretty specific things like if you move americans out or afghan allies, where are they going to go? and then like the july ish timeframe, remember afghanistan basically collapses in august and the june-july timeframe, they're still like, oh, we got time. we'll still figure it out. so like, that's kind what happened? i just want to add, you have this really anecdote in the book. i thought where jake sullivan is

sitting with different of the interagency, basically begging them to tell him that it was time to start the evacuation process being like, okay, now is the time and this was mid, early, early mid august. and he was saying really are you sure we're not we're not going to start the evacuation now? and they said, no, no, we have time. and this was literally days before kabul fell. so it was just it's a really remarkable insight into just how delayed the whole process. can you also talk a little bit about the dynamic between the white house, the pentagon, the state department during this process? because you also have another anecdote in there about how a state department official made some pentagon officials very, very angry with something that he with a remark that he made. yeah. so this is a guy named brian mccune. he was the very top level at the state department. there's had they're having a meeting inside the pentagon, basically talking about a whole bunch of things. it's a three hour meeting, part of which is, you know, planning for withdrawal. part of it is just regular updates about things. and there's a moment in which the pentagon is talking about how tough it's going to be to

get out of afghanistan and what just crisis that will unfold around them and what that would mean for americans staff and the dangers and the risk that they would face. and. mccune it goes on this fairly face that's too. but he starts talking about, you know, we've got to do this in the middle east before war. and, you know, we've diplomats are do this. and and he says, you know, we the state department must just have a higher risk tolerance. and for a bunch of generals, that's not a particularly nice thing to say in house. right. mark milley, then the chairman of the joint chiefs, was was offended. secretary of defense lloyd austin was offended. i know. i know because i talked to a bunch of people and they didn't take that kindly. and that was insight into where state department felt like they could be. they're right. there were still talks about the embassy being open and, you know, we can hope we can wait this out. and what do if the taliban is there? they're still open questions. but the pentagon was in the military was like speed of safety. that was their refrain right. get out.

if we're going to get out, got to go. because no military is more vulnerable than when they're leaving or withdrawing. so there were tensions there and the white house was caught in the middle of this, right where states basically trying to make a case to stay. pentagon is making the case to leave. and you have sullivan really going, okay, it feels like we have to leave. it feels like it's getting pretty bad. but no one's telling me we got to go yet other than the military and it's basically it takes the taliban to be right of kabul for state to go okay it's time. and that leaves that leads to much of issues. now, obviously to military people take a lot of risks state people take a lot of risks that part of the job. but i think the white house was starting to feel that they were really, really kind of close. and arguably they did cut it close, saw how improvised they had to do it all. but that has led to pretty large dynamic, where still some pretty raw feelings. i'm sure you sense it when you're reporting between state and dod to the point that it's

influenced even just relations and like ukraine and all other kinds of big issues. yeah. no, that tension is definitely always always there. and, you know, i'm just, you know, the way that biden his his decision to leave afghanistan and the fact that it angered so many allies. talk about how jens stoltenberg, secretary general naito, was extremely over biden's decision, really, because he, as you said, he decided really to leave before he became president and his his willingness to kind of buck allies in certain when it comes to his very deeply held convictions. it reminds me of how he's approached israel as well. you know, you write that he deeply impacted by his with former israeli prime over the years and how they really deeply ingrained in him that that was only place that they had to go and you that this and he has himself a zionist many times even though at this point right now his approach to israel is obviously alienating many of the

us's allies. but he's still very deeply held in those convictions. and so i'm just wondering what you learned, how his own of moral compass and his own you know, he's very well. i wouldn't say stubborn, but, you know, probably people around him call him that. and just in terms of like how he has a a decades long experience in foreign policy, he has many experiences to draw on. and that informs lot of the decisions that he makes and that he feels is right. so what did you learn about how that him. yeah. i mean, it's just this is the briefing notes, right? he was senate foreign relations committee chair. this is the stuff he believes in. his bone, in his bones, that he knows more than most people. one person on israel's specifically, one person that used to work for him in the senate, said he would always ask aides for advice and for counsel, but never on israel. on israel, he knew what to do. so it doesn't surprise me now as i think it's very clear that most of his staff are to his

left. let's say whatever our vernacular is on israel, it takes it took a long time for that to permeate through. he was steadfast. obviously he went there literally of bibi. but we have to sort of go back and if you're and if you're here or, you're watching this, then you already heard him tell us go my your story 30,000 times. and like that is so near and dear to him. but it matters to him that israel be protected that alliance matters a lot to what's going but he's also over the years started to care a lot more about the human rights stuff and the civilian casualties. so now we cannot deny, of course, there are political and political concerns with why the administration might be changing its tune has been changing its tune. you know, correlation isn't causation, but it's been close to the michigan stuff, right? so that's clearly a part of it. but he is affected by these images. and and it does seem i'm not

trying to over psychoanalyze but throughout his career, the more he's gone through his career, the more he has seemed to care about the civilian issues. well, so one anecdote in your book that's gotten a lot of attention is that he reported to have told the former prime of israel in 1982 that he would have gone even further than israel did in lebanon to include killing women and children if it was necessary. what was your reaction when you heard that? i found somewhere and i asked about it. i was surprised. i mean, he was further it was operation galilee. we'd have to go to deep into that. but you can look it up and he was basically saying, yeah, like do what you got to do. and he he is said this on multiple occasions, like, you know, why it sounds a little ron desantis it right like what the saying is that this line in his book about like should we do x thing for the sake of djibouti. biden's basically said that with an insert country here on multiple occasions. so he had this sort of unquote realist view of things that the civilian human rights aspect doesn't matter as much as, the

national interest aspect. and one could argue he basically had that exact same frame on afghanistan. right. there were tons of people saying i mean, mark milley was a meeting and in described me is getting emotional when he said like if we leave like women will be sent back to the stone age and all the progress we've made will be undone and goes doesn't matter, not in our security interests but whatever. so he kind of must have felt that way about israel, too. and of course, hamas did what it did. october seventh, which was brutal and horrific. and an historically awful 1200 people died. one day. my goodness. so i think that he just reverted back to. of course, that's a country that's been attacked and of course, a country that i care very deeply about. so i will protect it. but it's taken time for him to see sort of how israel conducts itself, for him to change mind. i think he can be affected by all of that. but but that takes could take some time. but all this to say is that. i don't know. i'm trying to be valid, very delicate with this kind of issue.

i just think that it he has his convictions and if he's going to be moved off of them, it requires a lot of a lot of by his staff to push them off. yeah. and have we have seen that we have seen his position evolve on israel or at least his public rhetoric evolve over the last few months. and i know you turned in your manuscript. october 7th happened. you turned it in, you know, roughly this time, roughly this time last or so. so none of this had happened. but you did have some reporting to draw on with how the administration, handled the may 20, 21 outbreak of violence between israel and hamas. and so i'm just wondering, you know, do you see any they learned in dealing with that conflict that they're applying now and particularly when it comes to biden's relationship with bibi? oh, 100%. so this if you don't remember, there was an israel-hamas conflict in may 20, 21, 11. it lasted 11 days. people died. it was it was awful. but, you know, the the administration and their mind, they handled it very well. what happened? hamas attacks as a response. biden and his team basically do what they would call a honeymoon

public vinegar in private or my is hug in public you know push in private however you want describe it and they believe that that's what you do do to one stand with israel publicly that helps just in terms of the stance and also in terms of the politics. and then over time, if you're doing that publicly. then in private, you can go, hey, you know, try to back off in these areas. just end this as quickly as possible. now, again, that works in 2021, in 11 days. but why the context? very different. the attack, while awful, wasn't as big. now we have, of course, the massive october 7th attack. we've got a more far right government in israel. we've got netanyahu dealing with a lot of court cases and low approval numbers and got an israeli public that wants to see hamas defeated. understandably so, as much as biden is, literally, like literally went to israel to hug netanyahu. right. like and then you know, stand with israel. that and continue to sort of push in private, you know, do this. but how you do it matters try to minimize civilian casualties.

it just hasn't worked much because the context is so much bigger and different that biden's sway is limited. i think we've been seeing that. so part of the answer to, you know, my circuitous answer to the last question is that biden is also seeing that his the 2021 approach didn't work or at least it hasn't worked, but likely work. and so now they're trying to find a new way and it sounds like it seems like they're just pushing more on the humanitarian stuff one because of politics and to maybe this is a way to shame israel into doing into caring about it but it's born of i think a bit of flapping, not knowing what to do because a 2021 playbook was a failure in this context. and you talk a little bit about his relationship with bibi because. they have known each other for decades. obviously, and that relationship has its ups and downs. obviously, biden has felt the need to embrace them publicly when when he feels that it is necessary, warranted, but obviously it's hard to work with bibi. he doesn't personally like bibi

very much so. talk a little bit about that relationship and how it applies now, you know, i'm reminded of sort of toward the end of the obama years, biden is in israel, i think was tel aviv and he's with netanyahu in anyhow because of occupy obama's book. you know here's, a tree planted in honor of, i think, biden's mom and his family like. the biden family is part of the israeli family and this is part of their you know, that's a lovely sentiment. and they were friendly and and all good. and, of course, biden had written this famous, i think, on the back of a card, said, you know, biden, i love you, but i've agreed with anything you've ever said. so they had this sort of fun. let's call it that rivalry. i mean, some pretty bad stuff happened, but i think understood each other. right. i don't think they understand each other anymore. i don't think biden biden's conception of foreign policy and everyone who's here watching is or knows it is vague and it's kind of trumpian. if i get into a room, i can talk to the guy and i'll know and. basically, all the foreign policy stems from just knowing the limits and what they're capable of accepting and not

accepting. i don't think he understands netanyahu's right now. i think understands where what he's what he's willing or not willing to do because his power, his or his livelihood is kind in danger. right. if he is to lose power, which many people believe there are elections, he very well could he could go to jail over many allegations of corruption charges. so in a way he's kind of has a desperate netanyahu to deal with and it's hard to negotiate with someone who's desperate. and so biden, i think his whole ethos of how to do foreign policy and how he's dealt with bibi in the past where even if they disagree he was the bounds of normalcy. the fact that netanyahu is so outside those bounds now doesn't make for as much a rational act for biden to deal with. and you have an anecdote as well in your book about a an instance where bibi really burned biden a couple of years ago when biden was vp and he went over there. can you talk about. yeah. yeah. i mean, biden's over there and,

you know, the whole obama administration basically saying, hey, the last thing you're going to do is allow for settlements. you know, in the west. and while biden is, they do it. that's what i was doing too early, where some bad stuff happens and was incensed and they were deciding whether or not to give a speech or whatever. and in the end, they put out the statement was basically no bad. no, no, please don't. and then they had a very tense. so, like, look, netanyahu's never been shy about and he had a bad relationship with obama. lest we forget it to the point that netanyahu here and gave a speech basically say and you know sided with trump and all this stuff. i mean, all kinds of stuff, right? so that relationship has soured over time. it was always tense, filled. it's worse now and look, it's obviously broken beyond biden bibi to have chuck give the speech that he gave last week where he's basically calling for the israeli people to vote in a new government and kick out

daniel. i mean that that shows that the us israel relationship has broken to a place we haven't seen in decades, let alone biden bibi. it's beyond bad now. yeah, no, absolutely okay. so i want to move on to ukraine and russia, because that's a really part of your book as well, is kind of walking through when the administration realized that the russians preparing to invade, but even before that, you know, i mentioned earlier the reset that the biden administration wanted to do with russia, and they would probably kill me if they knew i was calling it a reset because that's a dirty to them. but but they met with putin geneva in 2021 they wanted to have this working relationship. the russians understandable they wanted to to see if they could get it back on track, if not just because they're two nuclear powers. right. but that really created a bad taste in the mouth of the ukrainians, who, of course, were had been in a war with the russians over crimea for, you know, eight, eight, nine years. and so can talk a bit about what the rationale behind that kind of attempted reset for the biden administration and then how that

kind of set the stage for a very tumultuous relationship with president zelensky of ukraine. yeah. no, you definitely are using the bad word a no no word for the white house. i'm so i'm worried for your safety at this point. look, the biden team, as as i saw noted earlier, really felt they could put russia in a box, that the bigger issues they wanted to focus on were climate change and china and effectively globalization. so to deal with russia was to go, okay, putin and i we should note that putin, biden meeting was in the summer of 2021. before then there already a bunch of russian troops already around the borders of ukraine, which some of which precipitate hates this meeting and truly biden leaves, his team leaves and they go. putin understands what america's limits are. he's going to cross those lines now. he's asked by your colleague kaitlan collins, you know, do you trust putin? he no, i don't trust putin. but like, let's see what. he does. well, we saw what he did. but this whole time the

ukrainian ones and a new president, a guy, vladimir zelensky, is asking for meetings because, look, we've been invaded by the russians. you know, we you biden focused a lot on ukraine during your vice presidency. let's get a meeting. get me in here. also, can you help us fight the russians and they are just like thrown to the side. it's not a priority. in fact, biden gets like calls alinsky before talking to food and the like. zelensky comes to the white house after the putin meeting. right. so in the ukrainian mind, they're like, oh, care about the russians way more than they care about us. and that really leaves a sour taste in zelensky's mouth. who is who we should remember before the war is like the people in ukraine did not like him. the economy was bad. he was a comedian first. he had done this before. a lot of things were going poorly in ukraine and the people were really much against him. and so a meeting with biden would also really help him. but either way, the ukrainians took the lesson from that sort. you know, biden meets putin first before having zelensky at

the house in august of 2021. that really set them off. they were like this administration does not care about ukraine. they would rather to the russians than to us and leading up to the invasion leads to a very relationship between the two men and they were very angry about the fact that the meeting between and zelensky was scheduled late august when no one's in town to see. congress is in recess and he wanted some more recognition, right? yeah. i mean, august is like a slap in the face, right? if you're i mean, we're all we're all on vacation in august. and also, it sucks be a dc in august it's the worst month so. what do you think was the reason behind kind of animosity? i wouldn't say, but the kind of the fact they they were pushing ukraine to the side that way, even though they saw the signs that russia was potentially massing troops on the border, that this was a very urgent situation. i mean, president biden never had the best relationship with zelensky. why do you think that is?

well part of the main thing was russia's the big fish, right? this is a very much a team that about dealing with the big stuff, then really making sure peripheral things are peripheral. i mean, that sounds straightforward, but not a lot of teams think that way. and this team is very much kind of that pyramid, i guess, pyramid scheme that seems wrong. but, you know, i'm trying to get to and in that sense, you if you solve the russian issue, you sort of solve ukrainian issue. they saw right. if russia knows that they shouldn't go deeper into ukraine, then you've kind of solved the ukraine issue, in which case you can help them. and even though there are going to be little green men in, their country for the ukrainians, it's obviously not good enough. but if you're the admin, if you're biden like, look, i don't want to get involved in the ukraine war further, it's basically frozen. let it stay. also, yes, there are troops along the russian along on the ukrainian border, but like our intelligence doesn't show that they're to do anything. it's just an exercise. so it's bluffing? yes. he bluffed us into a meeting, but heck, we gave him the meeting. maybe he'll back off like these

were relatively well considered calculations at the time for the ukrainians that -- them off naturally, and that relationship hasn't. look, biden didn't think much. zelensky rated comedian tv guy biden doesn't seem to like guys who politicians who were on tv. it's you know, he's kind of considered a lightweight. you know, why deal with it? the putin's the big guy now. everything changes when when the time comes. so that's what was going to say is you could argue that this was all a very big miscalculation because it hurt the biden administration when it to convince zelinski and, convince the ukrainians that, hey, russia is about to invade and they're about to try to take over kiev. not only that, but they're probably going to try to assassinate zelensky and didn't actually believe that that was going to happen. he thought that the administration was overreact. right, because of their experience with afghanistan. and so they were trying to overcorrect. so can you a little bit about when the administration it dawned on them that this this is

really happening and kind of the frantic maneuvering around that? yeah, pretty much september, early october, one of my favorite scenes in the book is one where john viner, the deputy national security adviser, sort of sees the intelligence and goes like, oh, -- i'm not swearing because it might be on television, but but it wasn't --. and he goes to jake sullivan's office is like, what's going on here? and immediately everything starts moving. they're like, okay, start setting up an economic channel, start setting up a assistance channel, start setting up a sanctions channels. let's see if we can talk to the russians in the ukraine and see what we can get zelensky on the phone also tell our allies what we know. and as they're collecting intelligence, they're able to basically get pretty granular about what they what knew. we also know now that they've released a lot of that intelligence, some of which was saying that, you know, they were building hospitals on the border. blood, like all that kind of stuff. now, the interesting is, you know, the us tells allies and most allies of the uk. so yep. on board we kind of have it too. we all agree the french and the

germans took a lot of convincing but they were willing to have the conversations. it was the ukrainian conversations were so brutal because the lynskey was basically going like, okay, you know, afghanistan just happened you guys are being extra reactive. this isn't true. also like our intelligence service doesn't this information which we can chat about the ukraine intelligence service might not have this information, but that's a separate conversation. and then go, okay, if you america are so about this, if you're so if you so believe it's going to happen, why you sending me weapons? why do you want you sanctioning the russians? why are the allies doing that? why isn't everybody coming to ukraine's aid right now before to an invasion? if you believe this is going to be true. and this colored basically conversation biden zelensky had it got so negative and scream match they were screaming at each other on multiple conversations. in zelensky's screaming what i have just said. and biden you know, with apologies, ashton kutcher's like, dude, defend your country like, what are you doing?

get troops out there, mobilize. they the russians are coming in. you are not ready. this permeated every base of every meeting that they had. they hated each other. and this led to a lot, let's say, coordination problems not between the u.s. and allies were strong, i think pretty, pretty good between the u.s. and ukraine. extremely late. nothing sharpens the mind like having tanks roll into country. right. so zelensky like the second the russians today's like great thanks america for my weapons where you know where's my stuff. like let's do this besties. and that just you know and that is still color the relationship understandably the ukrainians more than the americans are willing to give and they're upset with how slow things have moved basically throughout the two years. but that original sin stems from the frustration of, you know, you can call a miscalculation from the geneva stuff and and how the u.s. tried to put, you know, ukraine the side. it also can come from just fact that, you know, zelensky knows biden because there's my light

considers him a lightweight. i mean it's clear and it's also from the fact that the alliance gives mine. there was there was a window to counter the russians before the invasion. and the u.s. and allies didn't take. so there's still, it's a working relationship now. it's not a friendly relationship now. yeah. and think one of the more interesting passages in your book is when you talk about how the administration learned from the mistakes that many of these same people made under the obama when russia invaded eastern ukraine and annexed crimea and how the obama administration really did not respond forcibly enough did not react. you know quickly enough to deter that and to basically punish the russians in a way that would prevent them from repeating. so can you explain bit about what you learned about the lessons they took away from that? and how they felt, you know, in how they responded this time? yeah. well, the most important movie you need to watch to understand the geopolitical thinking of the

biden administration is austin powers one. there's a scene in that movie where then madtv is michael mcdonald is playing a cop and he's screaming, no and then it cuts to austin powers and elizabeth on a steamroller like completely the other opposite side of the hallway, rolling extremely slowly. and so the whole joke is that he's going, no, no. and it takes forever. and then inevitably he gets rolled over. and that's funny. jake sullivan, who is known for both quoting a bunch of billy joel lyrics and quoting movies, had awesome powers in mind as he was the ukraine response. in his, he was telling aides, i don't want to be the cop who's just screaming no. when we can see, what's coming? so that and that's why the third part of the book about ukraine is called the austin principle. and he's been open about it like, that's the kind of stuff he thinks about these moments, which is kind of fascinating. anyway, all this to say is that that's how he view this is he wanted to do everything and get the government to do everything to either warn or prepare.

that's why you saw the intelligence for the first time be quote unquote, downgrade added or declassified and put out. that's why you saw a of u.s. officials go to europe and to other allies, countries both publicly and privately saying what was to come. it's why you had bill burns of advertise this trip to russia to, this conversation with putin in november of 2021. they did they could to like and why they were open about the diplomatic effort. right okay russia if you really think that like nato's expansion and this is going to be a threat to you and, that's why you're doing this. let's talk about it let's let's be caught trying effectively. let's have those conversations and it got to the point where, of course, the russians on the invading and the administration's mind all that planning was worth because the second the invasion happens, you start your allies start doing a whole of stuff. actually, one of the things that surprised me was after months of preparation and you know the us and europe had set up a whole series of sanctions and they

expected the europeans to take months to go through their list. they went through it in a week to the point that it led the biden administration to go, oh, --, we need things to sanction. they just started like searching around for stuff. so it's sort of this facet eating thing where they did about as well as they could have, arguably, and they i literally have someone in the book saying, look we did everything right. we still failed. and that was sort of an interesting insight into, maybe an america where we are a sort of an american moment, right. as there was a time where we had all this unfettered power, we couldn't always get everything we wanted, we being the united states. but now we're in this place where despite everything we have, we just can't control stuff much as we used to. and now we have to be a bit more reactive to stuff. and i think something that the biden team is still really accepted because they like to plan, they like to be ahead things in there and they're literally talking like revolutionizing global economics and etc., etc., when they're still struggling with with reaction. and that's something i know jake sullivan hates to have to react, but it has been the really -- of the first two years and arguably

too. and i think, you know, in terms of the testing, jake sullivan's proposition of foreign policy for the middle class, i mean, there's better example now than what we're seeing on capitol hill, which is the to get supplemental funding passed for ukraine, for taiwan. and, you know, the end for even for israel, you know, even given the very bipartisan support that exists for israel on the hill right now and the rationale behind the hesitance to pass a lot of that funding is, well, how does this help my constituents. why why are we spending all this money on ukraine, for example, when we could be spending it on the border if that's been the the line and so how do i mean i remember last summer when i was talking to some some hill aides were very concerned that the biden administration hadn't presented a supplemental sooner because. they were saying, look, are they just taking four granted that this is going pass? so talk a little bit about that and how they're kind of running that reality as well, something that they didn't necessarily expect. i've been fascinated know at the

beginning of the ukraine stuff, biden always talked about defense, where we're defending a democracy and doing this because it's what america does in a moment, like. and i was shocked they didn't start start using the talking points that they're using now which is if you stop the russians in ukraine, that means russia will go elsewhere. that means i have to send your sons and daughters into nato's territory to fight the russians so they don't invade. and also isn't it great that we're sending of our old weapons to the ukrainians because then that we get to make new stuff for our military shrinks, our military stronger, and also that means jobs for texas and ohio and alabama and michigan and wherever. that's a talking point. now, it took them months to get there and that was so anathema to everything that they had sort of been saying before. and this part of it is because that's how biden truly believed this issue to like when democracy is attacked, you defend it. end of story. there's no other question. you can also make that argument for israel right. it is democracy that was attacked. you defend it, questions asked. it's similar. i think there are other reasons there. but like still stemming from the

same general place, it's fascinating to me that now that they haven't made that i was in i was in jeddah in saudi arabia for the fist bump right between biden and mohammed bin salman. and the whole time the adminstration was going, well, we're here because of geopolitics, right? chinese are making inroads with, the saudi arabians and whatever. and we don't want to lose that. and also it's important to have saudi on our side as we normalization deals with israel and etc., etc. and then you get on the ground. that's what they're saying before we all flew. then you get into the hotel. and what is the administration's? well, we do need the saudis help lower oil prices because that's foreign policy for the middle class. there's nothing more foreign policy for the middle class than lowering prices. and on top of that, it's to have ukraine for you, because that helps the global food supply, which also affects prices with inflation anyway, all of these talking points that they use and we're sort of are either unwilling to and as much as they talk about foreign policy if the middle class they haven't really rung it it's always the second

order or at most second order talking point or case. and i've and i've never understood it because they're so adamant it and they're so adamant that this is what would take. and now this is sort of the interesting is, you know, i've struggled with this the current israeli case, the polls show generally their support for israel, but not support for the way israel's doing it right. so what is the middle class case at least? what is the popular case like? it seems like biden is not really he's following the general polls or at least is in agreement with most americans. you support israel, but then doing the, let's say, middle case of not liking what israel's doing so he might be doing that now, but even if that's even if that is his thinking and that's a stretch, but even if that is his thinking, it would again be, the second order thing. so i've been struggling with this and i don't have a good answer yet, but in it for sure, the foreign policy for the middle class stuff sound like an overall talking point and versus one that's like held with deep conviction. okay, well, we're running of

time. so i do want to see if anyone in the audience has a question for alex about book or about anything that he said. and if not, that's fine too. and if not, that's totally fine. paul. putting you on the spot about scorpions to washington gets a fistful time. so i guess looking at what's next here with the economy right there's stuff the administration is there four budget and 25 budgets going oh, there's no supplemental. we know this is going to live this year and suspect that now. case the administration cq brown the joint chiefs just went to a munitions plant last week and made this case because we're two years in and they haven't the case yet, which is shocking. anything you said about the budget and what biden's it's just not fast for tv so i mean you just said you don't know why

they haven't is they're talking to people have you asked especially they they you why they have to push this about hey this jobs job number on the part is kind of to and is more after the book but to reasons one they think it's too craven it's smacks too political like your following what people want but yeah for policy for the middle class is political. what like what are we talking here? if you're doing what people want are you like you need to sell it to them? that's a political projects. i've never understood that. the other thing is that it's actually not been particularly convincing like it's a it's fascinating to see like senator j.d. vance of ohio be far better at deflect that argument. the administration isn't making it like at the munich conference where he went to kind of be trump's representative. in effect, he was asked this i mean, the european reporters were asking, how dare you wear, europe, defend us? and then the american reporters were going, okay, but what about ohio? you're missing out on jobs, and

you go, i don't want to make effectively i don't want war to be a jobs program, which is kind of like it could have come out of bernie sanders. his mouth. right. and it was sort of a fascinating thing. and that is a general view that he and some of the maga right hold and frankly some i would say center right republicans hold and of course center left democrats hold as well that they don't want the defense industrial complex, let's say to be the reason for why we're doing something and administration has could make a stronger against that if they wanted to but not they're letting that argument hold so. yes you're right, paul. like the supplemental is stuck and it sounds like maybe speaker johnson will do a sort of a ukraine or israel thing separate. who knows? but the one like maybe the ace in the hole administration thought they they could use and they don't see it that way. but i would argue that was one of their main things they could argue they left it for too late. the it's already sort of been defined around them. so now even the middle class

argument, which is supposed to be what built their whole thing around scranton. right, pro-union, pro-labor, all this stuff, it's falling on deaf ears. and because i think they just made it too late. so so before we before we end it, did you have a question? sure. yeah. uh, thanks for joining us. i think by also came in as the antidote to trump on the international stage and he wanted to set himself up as america's back to international. levels that's going to be a part of this which trump is getting out of a you know, let's just do transactional politics. how do you think he has changed? and i say this, i don't think any of us know that right now. the third summit for democracy is happening in south korea, the first two were a big deal for the united states in the fight. and we're going to put all those marches here. and i want talk. so do you think he's more from a maybe idealist or a pragmatist? i think he's going to be seen. how is america down on the international stage underwriting

that's different than trump at the venue of care. i mean everywhere i've with with paul but i travel a lot every ally is just and not even ally but country them like yes we do sort of sense america's back or listen to more you know, we believe that blinken has biden's ear, the state department, all well and good great. and you come here and no one cares. and i'm not saying that pejoratively. it's just that feeling is not felt. it's not it's not as strong. and so i think in terms of the politics of it, the fact that we're doing stuff abroad is important more right. you can't really sell it much. you can only sell it in the of, frankly, trumpian terms, which is you're doing that but for what and in a way that was what foreign policy for the middle class was supposed to respond to. we're explaining to you how this is helpful and now they're not even doing that. so i think for biden, how is he going to remember? i think he'll be remembered as a very a traditional foreign

policy thinker who whose team try to do things differently. now, the one thing they've been very successful on is the that barely talked about to they've done a pretty good job of you know saying, okay, we're going to put up tariffs. and, you know, this free market stuff hasn't always helped our middle class and our and our manufacturing sector. and we're to build that. that may be an enduring legacy over time because he's basically you know, that was sort of an idea trump throughout the biden team took on abraham accords took on etc., etc. but i but the team clearly wanted a more of a revolution in foreign policy than they got. i mean, you mentioned democracy but i mean, you go on the white house website, right now and they'll say climate change is the central threat and number one, top national security when was but i mean. we barely talked about it here. i mean yes, they got some stuff done. a cop. i'm not trying to deny it. my goodness. i mean, like this by, their own

standards. it's not you know, they had met it so again, it's one of those things where, you know, you campaign and then in poetry and, you govern in prose. right. and i know it's overused, but it seems to be true. but i think this a lot more prose than even they expected to govern it. well, if no one else has any questions, i think that's a good place to leave it. alex, thank you so much. thanks for doing this. appreciate for for sitting here and talking us through your book. yeah, really good read. so thank you. thanks for coming, everybody. appreciate. thank