a barrier to care instead of an enabler. dr. trister: our time is -- steven: our time is about out, but a lot of questions about the solutions that need to be applied to the health care system before ai can have the benefi■óaldr. andrew trister, tr you get your podcasts. i will also be in the lobby doing interviews, so feel free to stop by and share your opinions on ai. but thank you for being here. >> discussion on the israel-hamas war after nearly six months of fighting, and a look at the prospect of a cease-fire. watch live at noon on c-span, c-span now, our free mobile video app, or online at c-span.org.

♪ >> the house will be in order. >> this year, c-span celebrates 45 years of covering congress like no other. since 1959, we have been your primary source providing balanced, unfiltered coverage of government, taking you to where the policies are debated and decided, alle supp'e companies. c-span, 45 years and counting, powered by cable. >> next, the white house council of economic advisors chair employment and its impact on the economy, during an event hosted by the peterson institute of international economics in washington, d.c.

hello and welcome back to the institute. i'm the institute's president. we are thrilled to have the chair of the international council of economic advisors to president biden. i want to give full credit to jared and his colleagues, who have been on this topic and doing research and advocacy and policy. in real-time, throughout the biden administration, buthymentn mind.

the attention goes rightly to the federal reserve and the so-called soft lanng thf understanding why it became a soft landing and what role the physical policy and other structural policies played rightly is evaluated in the latest economic report of thif e copies, these free to everyone. the government publishing office has it online. if you are watching online, we have a link. you can get your own 2000 page copy. but what is remarkable in the current edition put out under jared's leadership with all these contributions is the first

chapter othe benefits of full employment. not only why it matters, but bringing into the macro discussion the issues of hiring, evaluating the long-term trends, and to some degree why people were perhaps pessimistic about those in the past, looking about why and how a rising tide lifted the smaller boats more than the yachts, which we did not all think could happen, but to be talking about the economic report of the president. before i formally introduce jared, just a note that unofficially with jared here and the cherry blossoms task it's the official

start of macro season at the peterson institute. we have quite a lineup. of course nothing is as good as hearing jared. but we have quite a lineup over the next few weeks that we hope you will be joining us d will e back for some of these events, including next week on march 27 --is week. nicholas veron, sheila bear and graham steele on the future of the u.s. banking sector. our semiannual global economic prospects event led by karen dinan on the us economy with remarks by tian le hang on the ■ and mory obsel on our lessons from exchange rates. an update on too big to fail with martin gromberg, the chair of the fcic and tobias adrien from the imf among others taking

place wednesday, april 10. and then a horde of central bankers and those who love them in theollowing wk.articular i we relating to some of the other themes in this year's economic report of thedent our joint conference with the imf on steering structural change. the latest in our biannual rethin elicy conferences. we are grateful to partnership with the whole imf and others oq that. if we're going have green roads, if we're going to have and deal with ai, we have to be able to steer structural change and have it mean something more than it used to which is the oecd laundry list of liberazation. and we're very hopeful that our conference which i believe includes a colleague or two from the ca -- from theea will be addressing those challenges,

but again let's start off with the most important document on the most important topic of of full employment today. and we are indeed fortunate that jared bernstein and the council chose the peterson institute for this discussion. jared has been chair of the 31st chair of the council of advisors■< since being confirmed in the senate last june. he serves as president biden's chief economist and a member of the cabinet but of courser0 member from the beginning of the administration and was a prominent voice in public as well as policy discussions on all the macro economic issues of the biden administration and therefore this country. in policy he was mist and economic advisor to then vice president biden from 2009 to 2011 and served as deputy chief economist at the of labore clinton administration. dr. bernstein was a senior fellow at center on budget and

policy priorities from 2011 t senior roles at the economic policy institute which of course understates he played a key intellectual leadership role in making the episw what has becom. dr. bernstein has spoken here at the peterson before and worldwide inhas always been intn the juncture of inequality, macroeconomics, labor markets and trade as well as a living standards of the middle class. i know jared's also going to open briefly with some remarks about someone who we lost who shared a similar focus at that conjuncture of issues. 9but most of all today i am glad that we can all focus on the fact that full employment has been attainable and that the benefits have become evident ano

macroeconomic policy going forward. so with that, let meh invite jared bernstein to the podium. [applause] >> bef think adam and others, i want to speak a minute or two about the tragic collapse of the bridge in bmo spent the e white house trying to do all we can to help the presidentthink g about this, he talked about the scope of the tragedy and how he is incredibly grateful who immey got to the scene and talked about the people of baltimore and how we are with you. we will stay with you. r talked about maryland tough and while some were means something to folks in this room who know what i'm talking about. will get through this and we at the white house will be with

you every inch of the way. now turning to today's s true that like the cherry blossoms, i am past my peak. but i am still excited to talk about this subject with you. want to thank adam. he was the first person i thought of. and pie, the first place i of when we thought about where we would like to present this information from the new economic report of the president. i want to thank my friend david wilcox who helps guide my thinking on this and many other issues. i have a brief set of comments and then adam and i will chat and hopefully take some questions. on februar5tic speech since he took office, president biden discussed the urgency of his newly proposed american rescue plan by elating the needo quickly get back to full employment. in fact, he used the

phrase five times in that speech and i guess somebody else controlling these because i didn't make that happen but ok -- he, ok. i't to be controlling. but i have this year. he pointed out that according to cbo, if we don't take action it would take until the year 2025 to return to full employment. he cited outside estimates maintaining that if we enact the rescue plan, we could achieve full employment by the beginning of next year, citing the importance of standing up a nationwideogram wu recall did not exist when we took office. he argued we can get to full employment sooner. why was this new president invoking a concept that was here ■çnot much spoken about side of think tanks and even there mostly those that were labeled progressive or labor oriented? question. i know the answer. it's that president biden has

always believed that worker bargaining power is an edient to an economy that is fair, inclusive, and it stands in sharp contrast with trickle-down economics, grows the economy from the mi out, bottom up not the top, down, and that full employment supports the bargaining clout that he viewsa. it's why empowering workers would later be enumerated as one of the three pillars of bidenomics and why the benefits of full deployment is the first chapter of cea's new economic report of the president. i'll note here and as you see in front of you that the chapter was dedicated to my late friend and mentor bill sprigs who taught me thisimportance of ful. i also want to recognize the cea's chief economist dave ratner who is instrumental in our work in this space. important questions that the

type adam alluded to. which policies help us get there and stay there? while cea touts the benefits, where the costs in termof is full employment sufficient to achieve our economic goals or other economic vulnerable grou fortunes to overall growth? the chapter answers all of these questions in some depth emphasizing both theory and extensive evidence, some of which i will share with you in a moment. but since i want to move quickll only skim the surface of the answers here. i thought this was an interesting find from 1731. the statement here was that this is the earliest reference we could find for full employment -- i know back then they used capital letters fairly randomly as i see it. 'm not sure we would agree about a universal shield furnace to everybody but that's not one

of the benefits without. but i just thought it was interesting riches are diffused over the nation. that's a very clear statement of the equality premium we talk ou but the first question is what do we mean? for this crowd i'm sure it's a standard thinking that you could equal the lowest unemployment rate consistent with steady inflation that's ustar is a widely used guidepost. perhaps a more concrete perspective is that when unemployment is at its natural rate additional demand for workers is more likely to generate inflation than boost real income. that's in the chapter. dave and i did an interview and the first question asked was, what do you think full employment is? what is the number. we looked at each other like, howed for that question? the new administration forecast that just came out in the budget

has our terminal employment rate at 38 but there is a wide confidence around this and other estimates i think would lead me to believe that based on current demographics,■ ustar would be below 4, in the 3 or 4 range. chapter which is the benefits of full employment, i put them in three buckets. first the enhanced bargaining power i menti full employment ds more resources to those who would have relatively and absolutely less resourc weaker labor markets. some have called this full employment's "equality premium" and the empirical evidence of that time and it's a chapter. i'll take you through that in a second. the second is the growth contention, consumer spending and an economy like

ours helps promote steady and stable growth. this but i've talked a lot about it in the context of the current recovery. and this dynamic has been especially important as burned f and real earnings have helped cup some of that slack. third, more speculative benefits around what has been hysteresis.orn's law or reverse the idea that full employment can generate gainsboosting the y said. now let me take you on a quick tour of the evidence starting with estimates of the natural rate of full empyment which you know simply put our quite wide and varied -- are quite wide and varied. if we want to, we can talk about why there are so many different estimates of full employment but the point here is that, like many other variables, it's been a number that's been tough to pin down. i will point out the straight line, the cbo ustar measure is

one that gets used a lot in no small part because it is really easy to point and click and get to it. it is than the rest. it's also far less noisy than -- sorry -- is also far less nosy than earlier cbo measures. the reason is that they switched a bit ago to something they call the -- that they referred to now as the noncyclalrate, which whai believe it was in 2005 q4, they decide, this looks like full employment to us, so they assume that going forward and back they estimate the noncyclical unemployment rate holding demographics which in this case race constant.ti, that's why you get that kind of a flat line. ok, now turning to more

-- i'm going to buzz through this stuff. the idea of the rising tide lifts some votes more than others as adam alluded to. we now have the lowest black/ white unemployment gap on record. this separates it out for men and women based on work that kesner and others including dave did at the federal reserve. you see a fairly clear cyclical pattern although not much2000's. i think that has a lot to do wihe full employment periods in the recent history, the latter 1990's, the current period, you see a more cyclical response of this racial gap. regression adjusted for demographics and such. this is the same exercise with the employment rate. and here we have the hispanic versus the white gap in the epo,

you see a cyclical increase there, though more linear than the unemployment one. we have a number of scatterplots in the chapt. this one inspired by some work just in wolfer's had done. it looks at the cyclicality of t othe labor force participan rate. what you see here on the left is that groups with the lowest average in employment rate over quite a long period so groups that tend to have low unemployment don't have much variation in the unemployment rate. the absolute change in the unemployment rate over expansions and recessions. so if your college educated -- you're college educated, you are less exposed to cyclical ups and downs, but if you are someone with high school or less, you have average high unemployment and your

unemployment rate goes up and down a lot more and recessions and recoveries, so this is absolute change, down in recessions, up in recoveries, behind the black/white gap closure i showed you in a moment. one of the benefitsemployment if racial equity in the labor market. you see the same thing in the lfpr. the cyclicality of it is that with a low average have more variation in their labor force participation rates relative to those with much something i will come back to later when i talk about the possibility of lasting supply-side gains. this is an interesting take on something you may have seen less of before. it talks about how the job ladder becomes more acto less an periods of full employment. we know that in strong labor

markets, workers are more likely quit to rise up the job ladder. i will talk about that one i talk about the recent beverage curve research. but higher quit rates mean that the job ladder in periods of full employment becomes even more accessible to vulnerable workers. what the chart shows is when the implement rate is low, the job to job switching rate rises more for black workers than white workers. at least in my work, that is a perspective i had not seen before. job to job switches, more workers in periods of tight labor markets. that's a great finding. for disabled workers, from non-participation to employment, and you see a nice uptick in the full employment period of the latter 1990's and the last expansion and where we are now, again not much in the 2000's. i argue we were less apt with

employment. this is a particularly important story right now. the quality premium. here you wages for the 10th and 90th percentile workers. they grew together. they are growing in real terms, which is good to see. in this expansion, you see the 10% -- 10th percentile ll ahd, so you have full employment generating more wage. this dimension of the kind of premium i was talking about for full employment in terms of where the benefits disproportionately flow. here we are simulating the increase of a more flat labor market, but it's symmetric. you could

you wanted to do a more tight labor market, but it shows how households -- now we are talking about is a broader context. here you see the change associated with a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate cap. a larger unemployment rate gap or negative output gap, you see that for single mother households, black households. that turns into a 2% loss of annual earnings, and the grading itincome families, particularly for black households, single mother households, really the middle er than unity. again, because that it includes both a wage effect and analysis -- and an hour's effect. the hours effect is a potent

part of this. the graph earlier showed groups of lower lpr's■- more cyclical response to full employment. here's one i wonder if you have seen before. this is the change of the labor share in the unemployment r the gap grows. you see when you have a negative , labor share is increasing. that's a fourth-quarter change in labor share of income on the y access, so that correlation shows a negative correlation between output gap and labor share growth for labor share of national income. ok. getting to and staying at full employment, this is, as i mentioned, another one of the questions -- hold on a

second. got myself a little turned around here. my pages. here we go. what i just took you through is a subset of theefits. by the way, we are clear that full employment is no panacea. we include a detailed discussion of policies that go beyond the reach of full employment, including antidiscrimination policies, hud care, and housing. -- health care -- antidiscrimination policies, childcare, and housing. as i showed a moment a, supply . that's what i showed you with that "live from paris are due to plot. persistently, full employment

markets can pull in workers from the sidelines, and this certainly tracks the current expansio in ways that i think are very important. this shows prime age labor force growth, year-over-year percent change, and it shows that for prime age workers, the increase in the last couple of years has been historically quite strong. that mountain you see has really been quite important to the expansion. i ould pointut that research shows both foreign and native workers are playing a significant role in that expansion. currently, labor force participation rate for women aged 25 to 54 is a tick below the entire rate on record, which dated back to the 1940's. i think there's a case to be made in terms of supply-side gains related to full employment ovhow long they last is up for

grabs. second and much more relevant to anaconda -- to an economce like, economies will try to prevent unit labor costs from rising. the labor share figureearlier st entirely successful in doing so, but one way to stabilize unit labor costs is to discover efficiency gains that were not necessary to tap in the. speare the problem is that by assumption, any operating inside its production possibilities frontier should have been competed out of business. so i recognize that that explanat collides with some assumptions in micro, but i think that's ok. others have made this potential collection. connection. you see the citations here. between persistent employment and lasting

secretary yellen did so in a speech. and impressively empirical got into the question from 2016 have a quote, the evidence of highly persistent impacts on the supply-side economy in past events is not strong. this does not say that they don't exist but that they are also like them, we do n of a linkage between full employment and lasting supply-side gains. we have seen a bit of productivity acceleration in the current expansn, a this slide shows, although it's level is largely back on trend -- that's a trend from 2017 to 2019 some nice work suggests it takes two to three years or at least it took twoo identify a higher

growth trend in productivity, but we also think wherever you land on the full employment argument, the fact that it yields such strong equality dividends elevate it as a policy goal. to argue it also must permanently raise greedy. in terms of policies that keep us at full employment, we want to focus on not learning the wrong lesson from the post-pandemic and particularly the inflationary episode we are still working our way through. the idea that fiscal and monetary policy should be used to fill monetary gaps seems widely accepted, but we worried the next time out, policymakers will incorrectly assume that countercyclical licies are necessarily inflationary, so we focus on supply, demand, any persistent full past few years r

relationship to the rise of inflation over hundred 21 and 2022. we argued the collision of■ pandemic-induced supply disruptions and strong consumer demand that shifted firmly towards the very goods that were most supply constrained contributed to the rise of inflation. demand, we argue, was boosted by the accumulation of excess savings,uction in pandemic-induced spending on services and travel, supported by strong fiscal and monetary throughout 2020 and 2021. we write, given the developments over the years since■z5x■a■=■ te previous assessment, the cea has found more evidence that supply factors played a key role in both inflation's rise and its subsequent decline. consider thafu employment where the main cause of the increase in inflation, the subsequent disinflation in the economy has experienced, should have

slackening of the labor market. however, the magnitude of the so-called sacrifice ratio, the amount of increased unemployment reduced economic activity, requires lower inflation during the recent disinflation since the peak in 2022 suggests otherwise. over the period covered, which includes most recent data available when we published the book, the disinflation has bú of labor market slap -- labor market slack or job loss. kind of in the spirit of the bernanke analysis, we find that supply chain normalization, even on its own or interacted and th, explained about 80% of the disinflation in the core pce through q4 of this year. weav view

nonlinearity in this curve as important, a point i raise here in this space. we have our own slide showing non-linearity's using msa-level data. thus far, we have progressing down a part of that curve where the sacrifice ratio is low. that raises questions about the last mile and if there will be a tougher slog back to target on the flatter part of the curve. we also look at this analysis the the lens of a curve that ought tot high openings and low unemployment rates. another non-linearity. the idea is that vacancy drives relative to the number of it becomes increasingly hard to fill jobs.

that leads to a sticky unemployment rate relative to additional bracing -- relative to additional vacancies. the job openings rate could fall without an increase in job losses or rise in unemployment. alternatively, olivier at all argue that such high rates of vacancies where due to a decline in matching efficiency. because they were skeptical that matching efficiency would markedly improve, they predicted that declines in job could be affected by increased employment, which they showed to be historical irregularity. we dnot i their mechanism was correct or if matching efficiency did improve. it is the case that the unusually high level of job to job switching, which tends to

reduce matching efficiency among the unemployed, has come back down post-covid. openings have fallen substantially with little rise in the unemployment rate. point, our analysis shows substantial disinflation generated by supply-side normalization, including some degree of realignment while maintaining full employment conditions. none of this is to suggest that countercyclical policy had noing to do with the run-up in inflation, though in our model, slack by itself in a model where slack is interacted with the supply chain and post-pandemic disinflation. biden's urgency to quickly get the labor market back to full employment has yielded deep and important benefits at both the micro and macro levels. if there is one overarching

policy lesson from our work, it is that empowering workers through full employment labor markets remas one of the most important economic policy goals there is. thank you. [applause] >> thank you, jared. thank you very much, jared. as a capital official, he always the small stuff, but given the tragedy in baltimore today, i think that is even more applicable. we are all grateful for the vast amount of content that jared and his team has brought to bear on this issue. what i would like to doing to ps relatively quickly. then we will turn to our audience. this is all on the record. >> and i will go an extra five

minutes. >> you can go an extra five? great. what we will do is questions. thank you. first up, picking up on where you ended■m■y was a great deal of debate and concern in 2021-2022, including predecessors of yours, cea chairs in previous democratic administrations, about fiscal policy potentially overheating the economy. you have been very clear about where your analysis takes you and in your analysis, it is not a huge factor. i want to push you on this, not on the allocat variants in the last couple years, but more in terms of the applicability as it goes forward, tha partly, as

you and the town hall have argued, what was a unique or a least unusual setup supply factors, truman -- driven by the pandemic, energy response. does this experience feel relevant to you for a more let's call it normal time, that with the inflation effects directly from slack via fiscal policy, be moreent circumstances, or does this have more general applicability that people have been too concerned aboutthe past? >> i think that one should really give a lot of weight ofc economics and that fiscal policy remains largely innocent and is not proven guilty by this

episode. i have tried to stress in all of my discussions, inscling my words here today, that none of that says fiscal policy has nothing to do with it and, in was speaking, i recall, in the press briefing and say i do think the rescue plan is going to generate inflation , and i was pretty confident i was right. i think that■v that push you int direction. nonlinearity is really important . i think you have shown the importance of atd nonlinearity'a function of a highly snarled supply chain and laborupply as well, bumping up against quite strong demand. fiscal policy played a role man. that is why we thought it important to interact with slack

and fiscal policy in the model. one of the biggest lessons i think supply-side. don't assume it's going to do what you want it to. of 100-year pandemic is a particularly challenging data point if you have not gone through that. comments i made in the talk and what i just reflected here suggest a fairly aggressive, quick fiscal policy response to negative output gaps important,y warranted. getting back to full employment as quickly as possible is the best policy and be mindful of your supply-side. thaa second question, something that i did read the report before i got my lovely hard copy, somethingfeatured either r

chapter one of the report or your discussion today, when you talk been the surge in immigration we have seen the last year or two in the u.s., which, frankly, most of i, though it is obviously controversial in places, but just analytically speaking, when you talk about the improvements ■in labor supply, how much the return of both documented and undocumented workers to the u.s. affe labor supply, and does it -- that if immigrants to the u.s., at least, are not a major determinant of domestic power, u showed workers had bargaining power rising even as we have seen the rise in migration. >> immigration increases supply

and demand. remember. i should start by saying that president biden has said unequivocally that the border is broken and needs to be fixed, has presented extremely amtious and in my view potentially highly effective policies to fix the border, and the opposition has largely treathfootball as folks are tryo solve a serious problem. with that said, the increase in labor supply has been documented, as i mentioned in my talk, as coming from both foreign-born and native-born sources. when we talk about supply chain on snarling, if i'm being more disciplined, i say supply chain and labor supply improvement. immigration certainly proves -- plays a role there. >> thank you. now i'm going to t to the audience. we have standing microphones to my left about 2/3 of the way

back in the room. that's appear on tv. we also have a roving microphone. when called upon, please identify yourself, name and affiliation, and please pretend at least you are making a question instead of a statement. >> given that my timin the very, just put down your hand. if you could make your way to that microphone, and then we microphone. thank you. you're on first. gú>> there seems to have been a global trend where the response rate in a lot of labor market surveys have fallen quite decade or so, and what you had recently is that coupled with pandemic-era shifts in workndpr. this seems to be leading to

concerns about the quality of the source data we are getting on the labor market. i guess two issues for you. one, do you share those concerns about the quality of labor marketand two, what would you st we do to rectify some of the issues we have seen with the response rates?■ ■o>> we want to make sure that u can escape, so if you could pose your questions, and then you willes back. >> thanks. terrific preseatio i look forward to reading the chapter. hopefully it will give me some insights for my own work going forward. question is, i know when you look at inflation in the past few years, you did a big comparison with other countries. have you thought at all looking at other countries on this topic, the benefits and

costs of labor market tightness? it seems to me there's a really a range of experiences both across countries and over time that could be informative. >> or it could be a good research project. >> i have done a bit of it. i'm wondering if you have looked into this, have thoughts on it. quick let me start with the labor market data question. that's a great question. let me point out lee tucker, who is here from our staff. i had a meeting with him but before i came over here and he was raising exactly those points. talk to him afterwards and he will tell you what we are thinking. the remains very high. when you have a survey, i childa response rate has been in the 30's or something like that lately -- what you have there is , you know, just■v a wider confidence around the estimate. it does not mean the estimate is wrong, just that it has a large"

error, and that is something we should definitely try to improve upon. agency that does great work. they are well aware of these issues, and are thinking about ways to improve them. i guess what i would say is that -- oh. the very interesting thing going on right now, and i'm sure you know this.i think it was embeddr question, the difference between employment and payroll survey and household survey. nthe payroll survey has been picking up immigration better than the household survey right now, so that is an important thing to think about and to look at. broadly speaking, at least in the context of the presentation i gave, i feel very confident in the quality of the indicators we are using. i mean, it's a great idea and would be a great project, and we

have looked a little bit at that. i think the labor market and the fiscal policy emphasis are different in us versus them. in europe, much of the focus is on keeping people on the job. we did a little bit of that. maybe more than a little with the paycheck protection program, but broadly speaking, our significant fiscal spend in unemployment insurance, checks, money to the state, and i think the a 70% consumer spending economy and they have a 55% consumer spending economy made a big difference here. our fiscal policy went to consumers who have really carried the baton in keeping this recovery going. there fingerprints are very much on the macro dynamics i talked suspect is it's a little different in europe. i think one should do that

exercise because the inflation reports are global. in addition, disinflation is somewhat global as well. we have done better than many disinflation, but others have engaged in some of that, too, but i think when one engages in that study, it is important to payon to the different fiscal policies. the different policies that were implemented and their impact on for one thing, our unemployment rate went way up and came way down. countries.ot the case ima■# it did not go up as much or come down as much. >> thanks very much for this presentation. some economists say we are moving from a disinflation every time where structural forces were pushing down inflation to more demographics, globalization , to a time where pressures will be on the opposite side. i'm wondering what you think of

that argument and■ in light of this, how might that change the risk/reward around running a high-pressurenomy that's kind of what you are advocating? >> sure. of the last -- virtually the lesson of all the years we were reviewing the chapter most closely which i think would be thelus, 50 years, would be that given the general flatness of the billets of -- of the phillips curve, one can pursue full employment economies without unduly worrying about inflationary pressures, and of course, if you just look at the basic architecture of the economic theory behind all this, inflation should be stable. what i tried to do in my talk is

to break out some iq factors that persisted in the pandemic, persisted through nonlinearity d recognizing that that was very much a piece of pandemi■c economics, not necessarily structurally invented factor in the economy going forward. i cannot claim to know what the phillips cve will on th others of this. maybe it will be a little bit steeper, but i can tell you that through all the forecasts, i think the ones that have been the most accurate have inflation continuing to stay on trend, so we come away from this chapter unequivocal view that full employment and stable prices can very happily live together, and that is frhe of w. >> great. i think we have time for one last question.

>> thanks very much for this presentation. i wonder how you feel about policies to ensure the kind of physical response that you are suggesting is needed. because as we know, the pandemic kind of open a window for tax credits, higher unemployment, and so on, but that is a not easy thing. >> this speaks to uplifting the profile of automatic stabilizers . my colleague at the council has written a lot on that point, and i think that work is very stronn challenged on both sides of the aisle politically, and sometimes

many politicians do not want to have choice taken. th wantre is at least among economists and some enlightened legislators, a view ■> can be more automatic should be because the timing of these things, to the extent that there■1■t is politil back and forth and delay, can cause real pain that can be avoided and should be avoided, as i have tried to point out, both at the micro level and at the macro level. i think while we can have good and should have arguments about automating elements of stabilizers in the would broadle supportive of that, what is most important is that the next time we get a downturn that i'm pretty convinced that we will be

hit with the voices that say we cannot do anything because look what happened last time, and i think that would be a huge mistake. >>for joining us today both in person and online. we are proud and glad to hav hoe jared bernstein, the 31st chair of the council of economic advisers, for a presentation on the first chapter of the economic report of the president, 2024, the benefits of full employment. thank you very much. >> thank you so much. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2024] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org]

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